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Special Operations Forces Engagement: A Framework for Successful Security Cooperation
Building partner capacity is widely accepted as being in the national interest and is routinely part of our National Security Strategy, "Our military will continue strengthening its capacity to partner with foreign counterparts, train and assist security forces, and pursue military-to-military ties with a broad range of governments."0 F 1 ; our National Defense and Military Strategies, "We will strengthen and expand our network of partnerships to enable partner capacity to enhance security."1 F
2
; and defense guidance writ large, "Building partnership capacity elsewhere in the world also remains important for sharing the costs and responsibilities of global leadership".2 F 3 Determining what capacity to build though is not always straightforward. Even after deciding with whom to partner and what resources are available, the task of constructing a coherent framework of military engagements, training, equipping, and deployment of useful and sustainable host nation forces remains complex. Understanding the requirements and existing capabilities of the partner nation, coordinating guidance among national, alliance, combatant command, and the US embassy, as well as navigating the resourcing challenges of our security assistance funding streams add to the difficulty. This paper posits that a useful way to manage these challenges is to orient the security cooperation program, at least initially, on host nation Special Operations Forces (SOF).
There are several sound institutional reasons for as well as some side benefits to focusing on host nation SOF. The first is that US SOF, which should continue growing over the next few years, traditionally trains other national security forces and is especially well suited to train other national SOF forces; furthermore, as of 2008 US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) is specifically assigned the task of 2 coordinating security force assistance globally. Second, US general purpose forces (GPF) are also tasked with building partner capacity (BPC) and are embracing the mission through force structure changes such as foreign training units and regionally aligned units; however, they need the guidance and focus that USSOCOM provides.
Third, most nations have some kind of SOF and it is normally to lowest Joint level element; therefore, engaging with them provides an opportunity to interact with a wide range of warfighting functions in a relatively small entity. The benefit here is the ability to see across the breadth of the host nation armed forces to determine, in an informed manner, where to engage with remaining assistance resources or where to refocus once SOF reaches a steady state. Fourth, and perhaps most important, as SOF continues to grow in importance, using them as the core of a security cooperation program not only helps focus security force assistance, it actually produces a product in global demand.
Background
It is clear the United States values partnerships as part of its overall security strategy. The president's 2010 National Security Strategy uses the term 'partner' or 'partnership' more than one hundred times in its sixty pages. Global partnerships are one of the primary tools the United States uses to maintain international stability, influence, and a shared vision of the future; they create a community of like-minded nations and reinforce common interests by giving countries a stake in the global order.
Among the most important of these partnerships are our international military relationships, which provide a useful avenue to national leadership on issues of security building. This is a critical point as budgets shrink and the impetus to extract real value from our efforts increases.
Which security cooperation tools to use is captured in the geographic combatant command's country cooperation plans. Using insight about the host nation's military, the SDO in conjunction with Security Assistance Officer, inform the GCC on realistic goals that are also in line with the Ambassador's priorities and guidance. The GCC and the embassy defense team then work together to develop a coherent plan using all available tools to align resources with US, GCC, and host nation objectives. Normally, the most expensive and complex aspect of the engagement plan is security force assistance.
Security Force Assistance
USSOCOM owes much of its recent success to the network of partners that play a critical role in every operation conducted by U.S. SOF. The old adage that "you need a network to defeat a network" remains particularly germane. In an era of increasing responsibilities, competing priorities, and reduced resources, it is imperative to build a lateral network of partners and allies that proactively anticipate threats and enable cooperative security solutions in cost-effective ways.8 F
9
Security Force Assistance (SFA), a subset of Security Cooperation, describes those DOD activities that contribute to unified action by the US Government to support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions.9 F 10 The term itself is relatively new and is described in detail in Expanding the SOF network is about increasing and strengthening our partnerships throughout the global SOF enterprise. With current fiscal constraints, not only in the U.S. but worldwide, we have to find new solutions to effectively operate in the current strategic environment. In the U.S., particularly over the last 10 years, the nation has recognized the value of SOF in this ambiguous operating environment. I want to assist in building other nations' SOF capabilities to help deal with the myriad of emerging threats…There is a clear recognition that developing enduring partnerships is a key component of our long-term military strategy.1 2 F
13
In a 2012 GAO review of Combatant Command efforts to build partner capacity through SFA, three major challenges were noted: 1) Lack of common understanding of SFA, 2) Limitations in tracking SFA activities, and 3) Ability to develop and execute long-term SFA plans. 1 3 F
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The first problem is likely a matter of confusion over terminology. Terms such as security cooperation, security assistance, building partner capacity, and security force assistance are often used interchangeably despite some important differences between them. The second problem stems partly from the lack of a user friendly and useful database to track activities. For example, the Theater Security Cooperation Management Information System (TSCMIS), which is cumbersome to the user and, in 
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The number of available allies and partners able to integrate with our cyber and ISR capabilities is most certainly limited by technology, classification restrictions and global scope. The number of partners able to integrate SOF capabilities is much higher, as nearly all nations have those forces available to greater or lesser extent. Some countries are able to integrate their SOF forces at near peer status and across the entire spectrum of SOF missions, while others may be available for train and assist missions only. In any case, nearly any friendly country is able to contribute something to the global SOF network and effort. And USSOCOM acknowledges their contributions: "Globally, Special Operations Forces are contributing well beyond their numbers, and are known for their high return on investment. In the future, I see great benefit in developing a global SOF network. We are working through the geographic combatant commands. And bolstering our ties with the interagency and the allied SOF partners, we can react even more rapidly and effectively against our enemies. My number one priority is winning the current fight, while maintaining the health of the force.
But close behind that priority is expanding this global SOF and interagency network to deal with future challenges."1 6 F
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As for the United States, over the course of 2013 USSOCOM is expanding from its current manning of just over 63,000 to nearly 67,000.1 7 F 18 Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta commented specifically, "As we reduce the overall defense budget, we will protect and in some cases increase our investments in special operations forces…"1 
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The DOD push for Security Force Assistance, the Chairman's emphasis on globally integrated operations, and SOCOM's desire for and charter to form international partnerships provide the institutional framework for focusing our defense teams' security cooperation efforts on host nation SOF. But, in addition to institutional momentum, there are excellent reasons to build our engagement programs around the core of Special Operations Forces. These are conclusions of a highly engaged US defense team about SOF engagement based on described institutional changes, lessons from the most recent and ongoing conflicts, and direct observations after four years of working security cooperation efforts and indirect observations of counterparts:
• Because SOF normally encompasses all warfighting functions2 2 F 23 (command and control, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection, and sustainment), it informs a coherent engagement plan across the armed forces.
• SOF is easier to deploy and, in all likelihood, more relevant to future operations.
• As SOF is often a national asset, engagement provides the country team with access to the highest level of the military, as well as police and intelligence.
• Building partner SOF capacity is generally less costly than conventional forces.
• SOF is easier to involve in multinational exercises, thereby keeping the network and alliances connected.
Case Study: Slovakia
The following account highlights the advantages of focusing security cooperation efforts around Special Forces. To be clear, engagement efforts must be tailored to the particulars of the host nation and US interests and focusing on Special Operations
Forces absolutely does not preclude engagement across the breadth of military forces.
In fact, because of the breadth of warfighting functions found in SOF, focusing on them will often provide benefits across the host nation military and may highlight other areas of engagement. In many circumstances SOF provides a unique avenue for streamlining cooperation efforts and, importantly, resources.
SOCEUR and the Slovak 5th Special Forces Regiment engagement remains a significant success story worth greater study. In two short years SOCEUR and 5th SFR labored together to build a fully interoperable, competent and capable special forces unit. Today 5th SFR provides invaluable security assistance in Afghanistan, expanding the security umbrella and saving valuable US resources. The US Special Forces operators, almost to a man, have praised their Slovak counterparts as highly professional, motivated and competent. It is a relationship that demonstrates the power of engagement when done correctly. more numbers next to more flags. But, we wanted to provide a useful capability in the current fight as well as for future operations, meet EUCOM's country campaign plan (CCP) guidance, and affect the widest array of warfighting functions. All of this had to be accomplished with limited resources, had to fit into the requirements of the host nation and, critically, had to be sustainable by the Slovaks. All of these requirements simply highlight the dilemma facing nearly all security cooperation efforts; however, The push for additional contributions to ISAF during this period was driven largely Consider also joint and multinational exercises where SOF can participate at a much reduced footprint and, therefore, cost. And, while in the case of the 5 th SFR the exercises served the side benefit of pre-deployment training, they contributed directly to USSOCOM's effort to build a Global SOF Network. Two regularly scheduled SOF exercises in which Slovakia participated over the described period were Jackal Stone and Night Hawk. In 2011 they participated in Jackal Stone in Romania as observers; the costs were per diem and travel for the commander and his chief of staff, the benefit was exposure to the SOF network in action. In 2012 in Croatia, they participated fully with an SOTU and command elements of an SOTG; the costs were one bus to Croatia and two deployed Mi-17 helicopters, the benefit were advanced training for the SOTG Our security cooperation program, with SOF as the framework, resulted in a plethora of benefits.
• Dropping of national caveats in order to accommodate SOF deployments.
• Contribution of three Slovak SOTUs to ISAF with two SOTGs planned.
• Integration of Slovak SOF into the Global SOF Network.
• In-depth understanding of all warfighting functions across the armed forces and the resulting ability to intelligently expand the security cooperation program.
• Extensive access to Joint Staff, Ministry, and even national leadership.
And, while some of the benefits described are certainly unique to the circumstances in the Slovak Republic and the current imperative of ISAF, many of the lessons are almost certainly transferable to a number of other countries.
Sending the SOTG contributes to the fulfillment of the commitments to build defense capabilities within NATO. Implementation of militarily and technically demanding tasks by the Armed Forces will enhance the transformative effect and pass on the benefits to Slovakia. Implementation of training and counseling can also provide space for comprehensive engagement in SR reconstruction of Afghanistan after ISAF in 2014. Slovak government and non-governmental entities will gain experience and knowledge used in the preparation and the actual implementation of civil reconstruction in Afghanistan2 6 F 27.
Conclusion
Global threats, doctrinal changes, budget realities all highlight the continued importance of SOF in the future. Our most recent Defense Strategic Guidance in 2012 says, "Whenever possible, we will develop innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint approaches to achieve our security objectives, relying on exercises, rotational presence, and advisory capabilities. This requirement directly aligns with U.S. SOF strengths and core capabilities.'2 7 F 28 Threats from extremist organizations, unstable or ungoverned spaces that need trained security forces to make safe, and the ability to rapidly respond to unforeseen crises are all suited to the capabilities of SOF -both US and partner.
Doctrinal changes, driven largely by the lessons learned over the last decade of conflict, will see continued emphasis on building partner capacity through security force assistance. It is a mission suited to and mandated to USSOCOM; and, while US SOF can engage across services and branches, working SOF to SOF has built-in efficiencies. And while budgets will almost certainly fall across DOD, SOF along with cyber and ISR are likely to suffer the least and may even expand.
These are the institutional advantages of building a security cooperation program around building partner SOF capability, but there are numerous further advantages.
SOF normally represents the lowest joint element in a military structure, thus offering a microcosm of the armed forces in a compact unit. The ability of the defense team to develop a coherent, comprehensive, and sensible engagement strategy is significantly simplified. It becomes much easier to expand specific programs to a broader audience.
Intelligence training to the 5 th SFR S2 shop expands to the military intelligence service; communications training to SOF operators expands to the signal battalion and leads to additional military sales; individual SOF soldier training is opened to the entire force;
and, joint SOF training exercises requires participation of conventional air assets and logistics units.
As a practitioner of security cooperation planning, the recent changes in security force assistance and the global focus on SOF come with a small price and a huge benefit. The price is SOF becomes the institutional focus by sheer bureaucratic force.
The benefit, which far outweighs the price, is the emphasis on SOF provides huge benefits in terms of focusing the engagement plan, creating forces useful for global 20 deployment, facilitating access to the highest military and political levels, and providing a holistic view of the wider warfighting functions enabling an intelligent and coherent engagement plan well beyond SOF. A plan to address US interests in all its complexity.
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